Did a Fixed Mindset Compromise Safety?
Between October 2018 and March 2019, 346 people died in two Boeing airplane accidents. Scrutiny followed. The plane at the centre of each crash was Boeing’s fastest-selling airplane, the 737 Max. How did Boeing’s mindset around production of the 737 Max contribute to events leading to these accidents? Let’s focus on three crucial areas that can typify a fixed mindset business culture:
- A willingness to cut corners under pressure
- The value of counterpoint in business
- Minimising, negating and ignoring critical feedback
Setting the scene: Boeing playing catch up
Boeing’s 737 and the Airbus A320 have long been rivals. Each company hoping that their new generation of aircraft will outperform the other and take the lead as the best selling aircraft in the commercial market. The 737 Max was in direct competition with the newest offering from Airbus, the A320 neo. Frustratingly for Boeing, Lufthansa took delivery of the first A320 neo in January 2016, more than a year ahead of the first 737 Max delivery to its launch company.
When the 737 Max entered the market it was heralded as offering “the greatest flexibility, reliability and efficiency in the single-aisle market”. With almost 5000 orders from 100 customers around the world, demand was high. The Malaysian airline, Malindo, were the first to take delivery of the plane, it entered service on 22 May 2017. Less than two years later the 737 Max was grounded worldwide.
A willingness to cut corners?
Unethical behaviour characterises a fixed mindset business culture. A fixed mindset culture can lead to a readiness to cut corners and be less than candid about procedures, processes and performance in order to gain a lead on competitors.
Even before the ill fated Ethiopian Airline Flight 302 crashed in March 2019, concerns had been raised by pilots about the handling of the plane and aviation insiders were questioning the rigour with which Boeing had tested and signed off on a number of safety issues.
The Federal Aviation Administration (the FAA – responsible for certificating the design and components of aircraft used in civil aviation) has long worked with companies to exchange information to improve safety. This type of certification is reliant on companies providing scrupulously accurate data. It is also reliant on the FAA possessing and applying sufficient checks and balances. Rigorously examining and cross checking information, enables bodies like the FAA to isolate and address possible risk factors.
It was reported that Boeing pressured the FAA to move through the certification process quickly. Dominic Gates, aerospace reporter for the Seattle Times, interviewed engineers and staff at Boeing and the FAA and reported that,
“several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process. Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing.”
“There was constant pressure to re-evaluate our initial decisions,” one former engineer said. “And even after we had reassessed it … there was continued discussion by management about delegating even more items down to the Boeing Company.”
“There wasn’t a complete and proper review of the documents,” the former engineer added. “Review was rushed to reach certain certification dates.”
Ignoring Critical Feedback
When things go wrong, a fixed mindset approach towards the problem will see a company quickly looking to apportion blame. There have been multiple reports that pilots raised concerns about the handling of the 737 Max and that this critical feedback was initially ignored by Boeing. Minimising, negating and ignoring critical feedback is another example of a fixed mindset response when problems occur.
VW’s Dieselgate scandal provided a textbook example of this fixed mindset hallmark when back in 2015, VW’s US CEO, Michael Horn, explained to a US House subcommittee hearing about the emmisions -test cheating software,
“This was a couple of software engineers who put this in for whatever reason…To my understanding, this was not a corporate decision. This was something individuals did.”
The imprisonment of VWs former Engineering Executive, Oliver Schmidt in the US and indictment for fraud of former CEO Martin Winterkorn along with several other senior executives tells a different story.
The value of counterpoint for a growth mindset business
New flight control system MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System). Aerospace reporter, Dominic Gates, reported in The Seattle Times that the safety data that Boeing submitted to the FAA was flawed:
- In order to avoid the 737 Max stalling, the MCAS was designed to move the vertical tail to push the nose down. In reality the power used to move the tail was 4 x the force that had been stated in the safety document.
- hadn’t considered the impact of the system resetting itself following the pilots response and what effect this repetition of pushing the nose down might have.
- activation of the “hazardous” danger level was triggered by a single sensor on the outside of the plane.
The Seattle Times journalist spoke to Boeing and FAA engineers to gain this information and shared his findings with Boeing and the FAA before the second crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
The final air accident investigation report into the Lion Air crash is now available. When you consider Boeing’s approach to the development and launch of the 737 Max, you can make your own mind up about
- A willingness to cut corners under pressure
- The value of counterpoint in business
- Minimising, negating and ignoring critical feedback
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